In the quarter century after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, reunified Germany grew steadily more confident and powerful as the preeminent country in Europe. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered much of that confidence, forcing the country to undertake a pivot as expressed in Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s announcement of a zeitenwende, or watershed moment.
But what, exactly, has changed in Germany’s foreign policy outlook? Is the change in Berlin’s attitude toward Russia specifically, or in its stance on economic interdependence and dialogue as a pacifying force more generally? How applicable is zeitenwende to Germany’s attitude toward the Middle East, particularly Iran, or East Asia, particularly China? What about the military rearmament of the Bundeswehr?
There are few Germans better placed to answer these and other questions than Ambassador Thomas Bagger, the state secretary of the German Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Bagger is the author of a much-discussed 2019 essay in the Washington Quarterly, “The World According to Germany: Reassessing 1989,” and is considered one of the country’s leading public intellectuals and foreign policy professionals.
Please join Senior Fellow Peter Rough as he welcomes Ambassador Bagger to Hudson for a discussion on Germany’s foreign and security outlook today.
Learn more at: https://www.hudson.org/events/germany-world-foreign-policy-conversation-state-secretary-thomas-bagger-peter-rough
e e e e e e e e e good morning and welcome to Hudson Institute my name is Peter Ral I’m a senior fellow here and director of our Center on Europe and Eurasia and it’s my absolute pleasure and privilege to Welcome to the stage one of the big brains in German for policy Thomas Baga Thomas Baga has a long and distinguished career in the German Federal foreign officer he began when the capital was still in bond in the early 1990s in the Foreign Service in Germany has had a variety of positions over the years including uh most recently as ambassador to Poland and now aat secret which I think Loosely translates to something like under secretary or a deputy secretary in the German system in Berlin and uh it’s a real pleasure to have you here I would also commend to all of you uh the piece he penned in 2019 for the Washington quarterly which we’ve linked to in the announcement and event description at hudson. it’s a uh deep thought piece about Germany’s position in the world and uh raises a variety of questions of Germans assumptions about where it stands in the international Arena and uh what really makes up the stuff of foreign policy so I would commend that to all of you but first Tomos Baga welcome to Hudson Institute thank you very much thank you for having me my pleasure and uh hello also to to all of you watching on C-Span not just on our live stream at hudson. org but joining us from around the country um for this conversation now uh what I didn’t mention in that biography is that in 20052 2006 at the German Embassy here in Washington where you were posted you tracked American domestic politics I at the time was working uh and I’ll out myself here at the Republican National Committee and the research staff we could spend a full hour talking about last night’s debate but we won’t do that because we’re here for foreign policy although I might tempt you with a question here or there um so let me take you across the pond to Berlin and begin with a very basic question and that is uh how do you understand and what exactly is this word that Olaf Schulz coined in the days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine Satan vend or watershed moment well um thank you first of all for the opportunity to talk about Germany and uh how it looks at the world and what the world looks like from Berlin and where that might or might not link with American perspectives and and uh turn into practical cooperation as it did in decades past with the United States um Olaf Schultz coined this word of the Tian vendor which I think captured a uh not just a a policy shock but also uh an emotional feeling something that uh my foreign minister analina bbok described as we woke up in a different world on February 24 2022 and and I think when I think about it for me and you alluded to that article which sort of went back to the the lessons we drew from the fall of the wall in November 89 and how it shaped our thinking about the world and Germany’s place in it to me um the the Titan vendor marked by February 24 2022 Russia’s attack on Ukraine is like the book end to the 9th of November 1989 you can Define other ones there were shocks in between there were sort of the stuff that I tried to capture in this article which was written in late 2018 with the inkling of a changing world but not really with a full grasp of uh of what we’re in today um but uh but I think in in German thinking it will looking back it will Mark the bookend of 32 uh good years for Germany essentially and now T what does Titan vender mean it means the the shattering of some fundamental German assumptions about the world and foreign policy Germany’s place in Europe and the world it marks um uh significant policy shifts first of all and that is was the immediate context of the Chancellor’s Tian vendor use um a massive investment in our own defense in our military capabilities which had been neglected over decades as part of the peace dividend um but I think it has a broader meaning and a broader context because it is about other policy challenges as well the future of the German economic model the future of the German uh Industrial strength the future of the car automotive industry under the Dual pressure from digitization and and uh the transition to electric vehicles um it it is about the broader transformation to a carbon free um uh economy but it is also a mental shift it’s in the end it means reexamining some fundamental assumptions about for example economic interactions with the rest of the world we for three decades we expanded these interactions because we believed that um that was not just the source of our prosperity it was also sort of a tool or a means to improve efficiency around the world spread Prosperity around the world and thereby create a political effect as well and a lot of that is under renewed scrutiny today so Satan vend is not just um a a a new new German understanding of Russia but it’s a new German understanding of foreign policy RIT large yes absolutely I absolutely I think sort of the um Russia is at the core of that uh transformation and of that change in thinking because it was the the most blatant proof that some of our Lon held assumptions simply did not hold up to reality and I’m not talking about sort of an illusionary German idea of transforming Russia into a democracy that was long gone but there was still a belief that the mutual dependency as we looked at it the the the the the mutual stake in that energy relationship would contribute to a more restrained and more predictable foreign policy also on the Russian side and that was simply wrong in Hi Side so that’s the most immediate change but I think the changes go far beyond that and one of the I I think if you broaden it a little um uh that you look at economic interactions with the rest of the world not solely through a prosperity and efficiency prism but also through a prism of dependencies vulnerabilities and the question of what kind of Security Premium do you actually have to add to your economic interactions in order to uh make sure that you’re not too vulnerable and that you you safegard your own security but that strikes me as having pretty significant implications also for Iran policy no doubt because at least one of the I think governing assumptions of the jcpoa of which Germany was a great Champion is that uh some sanctions relief and economic exchange with Iran might produce a more fruitful full foreign policy relationship with the Iranians does that mean that we’re seeing a a fundamental paradigm shift on European attitudes towards Iran as well or is that is that an unfair characterization or how would you put it I should say well I think that we’re we’re certainly in a different stage with in our relations with Iran today then and maybe this is a good day to talk about it as they have their presidential elections today in Iran but um we the the only presidential election anyone’s talking about in the US today the hope the um now I was tempting you but the um the hope of the of the jcpa was I mean first and foremost to reign in Iran’s nuclear program which we still consider a major major threat uh uh to Israel but also to the international nonproliferation regime and to nuclear stability around the world but you’re right that there was a corollary to that and that was the hope that with that agreement however limited to the nuclear question that would open up a more constructive relationship between Iran and the region Iran and the world and that was part of the economic incentive to get the Iranians to the table and to sign and that hope hasn’t materialized hasn’t materialized sort of in the immediate aftermath and certainly not after the US withdrawal from the agreement and in in the year since so um uh so I think the the hardliners in Iran have certainly uh had the upper hand um if you look at Germany’s interaction with Iran today our trade I think is 40% down from even 2015 when the harshest set of sanctions pre cpua were in place so we’ve gone downhill from there uh we’ve just uh the the German government has just um introduced um in in the European Union a proposal um uh to list uh the Revolutionary guard as a as a terror organization uh on the basis of German uh court rulings uh that they were behind arson attacks on a synagogue in Germany uh against Jewish institutions in Germany so things where we clearly say this is unacceptable um we have to act we have to show them the limits but so it’s not a productive it’s not a constructive relationship at the time but we still need to deal with the Iranian challenge that’s not a solution that is sort of an approach that we have that tries to to send a signal to the IR Ians that their behavior is not tolerated but the reality is as you know also in the region uh that we have to reckon with Iran’s capabilities uh and it sometimes incendiary actions there were some reporting that there has been disagreements between the Americans and the E3 on sensor resolution movement at the ia uh what is our I mean setting aside the teror designation which I would welcome and I think is important what is our forward-leaning strategy to actually tackle the Iran nuclear weapons program as of right now do we have an Iran strategy as a West well we still have uh the remnants of the jcpa and we we felt together with our E3 Partners Britain and France that uh we should not let Iran get away with um uh constantly uh not being in compliance uh with uh the the parameters of the jcpa and that therefore this Board of Governors meeting uh of the international atomic energy agency uh was a good occasion to put that in writing and to have a vote on it that actually um stipulates that Iran is in non-compliance with its own obligations um but that is just stating the obvious uh that does not yet translate into a strategy of what we how we proceed we will have the jcpoa in place until Autumn next year um I uh since you alluded to an election campaign going on in this country I I don’t have two high expectations that we will now sit down and devise a strategy on uh on on how to go forward and also how to leverage uh that expiration date next year but we will have to do it at some point also across the Atlantic but there are no Rumblings of Snapback which is not an American option but something that sits with the Europeans I I think that is something we’ll have to discuss then once the time has come and and and once we have uh sort of people around the table who realize that that is uh the next big issue that that also across the Atlantic we have to we have to Define what we actually try to achieve well since you said something we have to discuss I didn’t even ask at the outset your here basically a week before the Washington Summit many officials will be traveling here from the alliance next week yet you’re here this week what brings you to Washington um what secret back room negotiations are you involved in that you want to tell us about it was not yesterday night’s debate although I did take advantage of a of a a local flavor uh debate watching uh um no it’s I mean we have uh um we I think the two biggest issues um uh in in foreign policy uh Russia’s continued war against Ukraine and the situation uh in in Gaza and the confrontation of Israel and Hamas and with all the risks of a wider Regional war and and and broader escalation those are the two things that occupy mines in Berlin but as I could judge already in the last day and a half also in Washington were very close on both of these issues um that solving them or close to an escalation on the we’re close between Washington and Berlin in how we look at these conflicts its Origins uh its risks but also possible ways forward uh and uh as with so many foreign policy problems they don’t lend themselves to Solutions in the in the in the normal sense of the word um so we’re working on them uh and I’ve had a number of of conversations that I’ll continue this afternoon and obviously the NATO Summit uh is also part of those conversations but I think we’re on a good track there uh send a strong signal of support continued support for Ukraine um uh send a strong signal uh that the alliance is committed to strengthen its deterrence and defense and that Europe allies are actually uh having a good story to tell Germany included which has uh which has by when I talked about the transformation not just in thinking but also in policy uh this is the first year where we will go significantly above 2% uh of defense spending spending almost hundred billion dollars on defense and a lot of it on Fresh procurement um uh so that’s not that doesn’t mean we have completed that trans but but it’s well underway and I think we have a good story to tell as the alliance and do you have confidence that when the next budget cycle is hit with the Sund fugan spent the hundred billion doll special fund that was announced and the obvious issues of court rulings in Germany differences amongst the Coalition we can stay at the 2% you did you detect that political will in in your conversations with the decision makers in Berlin that defense will almost be ring fenced at 2% and above yeah I would say two things to that I I think first um there is a clear political commitment uh among the three parties uh forming the current government but also uh the the conservative opposition um that um we we committed to sustaining uh 2% uh plus of defense spending of GDP for defense spending in the future and secondly um that the there’s a realization sinking in over the over the last couple of months that um the that what Russia has started as a war of aggression against Ukraine and about control of Ukraine’s fate uh has marved into a Russian military industrial mobilization that points to a much larger uh to the willingness of a much larger confrontation against the West more generally uh and including um the NATO alliance and that therefore uh we have to be prepared for a much longer confrontation and we have to not just think about how we can assist and help Ukraine uh fight for its own freedom and Independence but also strengthen and reconstitute actually our own militaries by investing into armen’s Industries production capacities uh across Europe that’s what also happening in in Germany so that’s that’s one thing I won’t deny however that this is going to be a tough Challenge and I think what you see for those of you who watch German politics a little closer uh were in the final weeks of a very tough budget negotiation uh among the three parties and since you alluded to Chancellor Schultz’s Titan vender speech in three days after Russia’s aggression so at the end of February two and a half years ago what he did then was to say we need to invest more in our own defense and here’s a 100 billion Euro extra fund to do that um but this did not address the difficult question of uh tough tradeoffs if you do that if you spend more on defense where do you take it from if you can’t pluck it from the air um and and I think that’s what is that’s we’re now in the midst of uh to in in in this situation of tough tradeoffs on the political level and that will be one of the first things on sort of on top of the desk of any new Coalition after the September 2025 elections um because if you want to uh have a sustained uh financing of uh of the 2% for defense uh you will have to come up with some tough trade-offs already in the Coalition negotiations I personally I have no given what I try to say about sort of the realization of that broader and longer term threat from Russia I have no doubt that that will happen um but it will not be pretty at every moment well we’re having a similar debate in the US senator wicker of Mississippi the ranking member of the armed services committee has a new plan out to go to 5% of GDP on defense and I was just at a foreign policy Retreat where the budget uh analysts then talked about uh entitlement spending and where the trade-offs might lie and uh these are these are tough choices we have some students with us today hea and so I want to um help have you help them with a with an exam question because you’re well placed to answer this you worked as one of the closest of AIDS to the German president fan you’ve worked in the foreign Ministry you obviously uh have been in and out of the chancellor over the years when we watch German policy formulation what is the interplay between those various actors there’s Chef Sak there’s Olaf Schultz the chancellor but then there’s the minister that comes from a different party here in the US Joe Biden can wake up and fire Tony blinkin like that uh Emanuel mcon can get rid of his foreign minister if he wants as well it’s not quite the same in Germany um how does that Express itself in in Germany’s foreign policy and how does it work um you have to pass your own exam yeah know there there would be many stories to tell about that but it’s it it you know part of what has part of what has animated me over the years to sometimes write about German foreign policy and then publish it in English sort of write in English and publish it in an American Journal is that I O over my three plus decades as a German Diplomat I’ve realized that what we do and how we do it is not always easy to read from the outside and that’s partly a language issue but not only a language issue and it’s not only true for American observers from a distance coming from a presidential system where Authority flows from the top and you have uh sort of government coherence is uh is is not always easy to achieve if you think of the inter agency process but that happens mostly behind closed doors whereas in German where we traditionally had a two-party Coalition now we have a three-party coalition where every party has its own political program and if you want to strengthen your political profile it means you have to um you you have to fight some of these fights also over the direction of foreign policy in public because you you actually depend for your own political career future survival you depend on sharpening your own profile then that that creates um a sense of uh of uh Meandering internal contradictions lack of coherence whereas in reality I would say it is part of that process that happens also in other systems but mostly behind closed doors um and now there are reasons for that the way our system is structured uh from the election system all the way to the to to our federalism strong regions lender um uh with strong competences of their own and then a federal government um a lot of that is a product uh of our own history and set up after the war to prevent the centralization of power to mitigate the centralization of power and so in a way um not just we Germans but also the Allies after the war have created a German system of governance that that makes it deliberately more difficult to take quick and far-reaching decisions or to have uh sort of a ship turn on a dime it’s more like a you know this is a tanker this takes a while consensus building in German foreign policy is a is a much more is a much lengthier process uh if you will it’s say for the students it’s more of a haror masian uh process it’s sort of a a discourse that happens in a room where there is no Central Authority where you have to convince either through the power of argument uh or sort of by simply repeating discussions over time and nudging in a certain direction so we’ve actually manage to in this government and after the the shock of Russia’s War um to write the first ever National Security strategy and pass it by consensus in the German cabinet a year ago uh We’ve written the first ever China strategy and passed it by consensus in the government uh in in the cabinet but there are still different nuances that exist between a Ministry of economy and trade a Ministry of digitalization the foreign Ministry the chancellory and and to iron that out and to to to create a sense of direction um I sit in Endless meetings among my state Secretary colleagues from other Ministries uh uh trying to to uh uh um when trying to shape trying to shape a consensus how these Str strategic orientations translate into single operational decisions of any consequence in your system that would happen through the coordinating mechanism of a National Security Council that is something we don’t have in our system and Ministries line Ministries are far more independent in our system uh and far more responsible for the for their set of policies than in the American system although the meetings are no less endless here and I I agree and just last last word on that it’s not just as I said it’s not just uh difficult between sort of sometimes from the US to understand why it takes so long or why one Minister says this and the other minister says that um it’s also between France and Germany actually because they come they also they look from their presidential system and they don’t quite know are the are the Germans so difficult because they don’t want to or because they cannot or what is the problem well the problem is it’s a different setup that was designed from the beginning uh uh not to be rash and not to be radical uh and and we have to deal with them so you have a national security strategy the first in your country’s history modern history you have a a China strategy um do you think there’ll be a Russia strategy written and and if so what would it say uh um I don’t think there will be a Russia strategy written I think the you alluded to in the beginning is the tiitan vendor all about Russia or is it about other things as well and I try to say it is first about Russia and it is the it is the fundamental recognition that our assumption that there can only be Security on the European continent with Russia is no longer valid not because it was an analytically crazy idea but because Russia decided uh to Define its own future not just in opposition to the west but actually an open conflict with the west and fighting it out over Ukraine um so that has moved the needle in the German debate to a position that says Security in Europe can only be had uh against Russia for the foreseeable future and that means investing sort of divesting from Russia investing more into our own strengths we haven’t managed as much as we tried genuinely tried to shape Russia’s behavior in a more constructive Cooperative direction we failed in that was that our fault was it their fault that’s for historians to judge I we have all have our own questions where we went wrong in in the past but I think there there can be no doubt that the focus will no longer be sort of when we think about Russia we we will continue to think about Russia but not through the prism of how do we uh sort of influence Russia’s Behavior by engaging with it but how do we change Russia’s calculus by investing into our own strength that’s the Russia strategy and do you have you noticed an appreciable I I dare not say Improvement but change your relations or appreciation in Central and Eastern Europe for Germany’s new understanding of of Russia uh well as you as you said I spent uh um one All Too Short year between the summer of 22 and 23 as German ambassador to Poland and I got an earful of we told you so um but I think there is a recognition um that the German perspective has changed that we’re um that we’re actually investing a lot in um uh strengthening the the security and the collective defense guarantee of NATO specifically in the Baltic states specifically most of all in Lithuania uh with the buildup of a full combat Brigade uh German soldiers on Lithuanian soil um but because Poland is particularly dear to my heart um I um on Tuesday we’ll have the first uh full government to government consultations between Germany and Poland and Warsaw and uh there will be a uh quite a comprehensive action plan uh to be adopted uh and at the core of that is uh joint efforts to assist Ukraine and uh and more joint efforts to strengthen and cooperate in security and defense and I think that is much appreciated also because of the change of government in Poland that’s that’s clearly um that has opened up space for more cooperation but I I think there’s something for us to do to to invest in that relationship um because in many ways they they perceive themselves to be the kind of Frontline states of NATO like the West Germany I grew up in in the 1980s let’s move to China and um there as far as I can tell the uh the junker commission’s tripartite approach to China the systemic rival strategic competitor and opportunity partner that remains basically still in place or that’s still it’s still kind of The Guiding Light of uh of of European policy even if maybe the emphasis is shiting within it um number one would you say that’s true and number two this is the part that’s always flx me where do you see actual progress on the partnership front with China and I asked that because when wiof underline was here at Hudson and we had a fireside chat similar to this um she raised um the partnership as one component and I said um give me an area and she raised as many do climate change for example and yet when I look at climate change are there areas where Beijing has come forward and moved in our Direction I mean what are we actually getting from that third part of the stool so to speak another is is is a global Public Health but there I mean on account of Co it seems another area where the Chinese have been at least to my viewing pretty atrocious yeah no I well on your on on the first part of your question I think um um we we still employ these three C categories but I think it’s it’s quite clear that um the emphasis have has shifted um uh from uh a focus on partnership and cooperation to more competition and uh and uh and and even more rivalry um and uh but as I said that also depends on the policy areas and therefore sort of differs from Ministry to Ministry to some degree um but I think I mean there is there is no doubt that we um that we still profit from the economic interaction with China which is you you know the American numbers much better which is an enormous economic relationship even though lopsided in trade um but it is still profitable for both sides and and that is also true when the German case we we which is why we have focused in our own China strategy on saying we need to focus on on what we call drisking uh reduce um uh over dependencies vulnerabilities uh from China as they have become obvious during the covid crisis how much of medical equipment sort of basic medical stuff like masks is we we’ve sourced only in China and suddenly were not available or only at elevated prices um but then also on raw materials uh on increasingly this is relevant for technology questions um but but this is a d risking part that has many facets Chinese inward inest investment in in German technology companies in in Europe more broadly but no decoupling so no full rupture with China economically uh also because it we it would hurt our economy tremendously now we have based that China strategy uh very clearly um on an analysis and we’ve we’ve been as straightforward with the Chinese as possible in telling them um your behavior has changed the the China’s approach to us to its neighbors to the international uh Arena has changed in a way that forces us to revisit our own China policy this is a reaction to your behavior um I found it quite interesting that when I when I go to [Music] Beijing there is there’s clearly an obsession with the United States the US is behind everything that happens to China um and that extends far beyond the policy circles um and the second argument then is sort of a little more subdued but it basically says and you Europeans when you talk about drisking you do that because the Americans told you so and we try to tell them uh you know we can we this this is sort of your judgment but we can only tell you uh Europe Europe has its own interests when it comes to China and we’re affected by Chinese actions in our own right and so our policy our China strategy our changing approach is a reaction to your policies to your actions it’s not we’re not on China we’re not America’s poodle uh we may uh we may agree with the Americans on many of these issues uh especially you know South China Sea um uh uh sort of Chinese behavior that needs to respect international law um but uh but not on everything CH we don’t look at China’s challenge as a as a you know a a geopolitical challenge for Primacy because we Europeans don’t look at ourselves as number one so that’s not where the Chinese challenge us they challenge us on technology on on economic issues on trade issues uh which in the competence of the commission so that’s the uh the dispute we’re going through with China now but it’s say sort of we have our we have our own approach to China last word on your uh on the partnership uh Dimension be beyond the trade and economic partnership uh that we want to hold on to um I I think you’re you’re right about some of the sort of the skepticism also on the climate change agenda because they’re still holding on to a position where they try to say well we’re big but we’re still a developing country and so we don’t have to commit to climate financing for example in order to make cup 29 in Baku a success uh this is for you in in the west sort of the Legacy emitters to to do um and we I think we have to continue to challenge them on that um and to nudge them as much as we can so but I think what I think what’s driving our our approach to to trying to engage China as a partner on on the climate change issues is that we won’t come to a viable approach on the global level without China but that doesn’t mean that they that they’re already there or that they’re delivering better on that than they do on on some of the other items on the agenda on the dr- risking in particular are you comfortable with the rate of progress are we moving quickly enough to where political and foreign policy coercion border on blackmail is not really a viable strategic option for the Chinese or is it more rhetoric and slow movement because sometimes just um as background I think in the American context this is regularly and permanently in the news but we’re we’re a bit uh it’s like swimming through molasses on actually executing the steps sometimes because it is difficult um to your point it’s been decades since the end of the Cold War we’ve built this globalized world of connectivity and on things from critical minerals to other Supply change we’ve Supply chains we’ve obviously grown reliant on others are we doing okay well I think we’re moving in the right direction um and and there are certain areas where we’ve moved quicker and more successfully than others I think we’ve moved quicker on um inward investment screening and also sort of discouraging certain Investments that would have happened a few years ago but no longer happen today from the from the Chinese side um so you have a dramatic fall off in Chinese direct investment in Europe and most of what is still coming in is in uh new electric vehicles and most of that actually goes to Hungary um as as one of the last sort of openly wellcoming countries with no apparently no screening but rather incentives for more Chinese investment um there are other areas where it’s much tougher um I I think on uh on specifically on on raw materials um this only the water bottles on uh raw materials dependence uh I think we’re still we’re we’re mostly still in the process of figuring out uh how serious it actually is and and where the options are and how expensive and complex they would be and we don’t have big companies sort of extraction industry companies that that that could be activated or mobilized in in in that sense so that that I think that’s more a a matter of a decade uh possibly more to to move towards in in more Independence it’s very interesting talk with the with the Japanese about that because they have they’ve created uh government instruments to help industry to to open up new sources and and make them viable also commercially um I in general I think on Dr risking um you know everyone knows um what the general sense of direction is but at the same time it’s a pretty vague concept that needs to be operationalized and translated into regulatory measures policy measures uh but also company decisions business decisions um uh not simply to bet on availability on a global market but to say we need to we need to be sure that we have access we need to be invested in that supply chain um and and I don’t think that there’s an exact formula for that so I believe it’s good to have a certain um you know a certain competition for the best approaches but to constantly compare notes not just between Washington and Berlin but also among Europeans with the commission that has been developing a whole toolbox of dealing with the Chinese Challenge on these issues but also with the South Koreans and the Japanese for example where I was in in uh February and which is very interesting conversations of how far they believe they are but I I believe this this issue this challenge of drisking will not only stay with us through the next decade it it may also become more acute depending on the future trajectory of Chinese political action I think one area where I detect a Nuance this this disagreement is putting too strongly but difference maybe between uh the United States States and Europe right now and China policy is on Russia’s war in Ukraine and um maybe I’d put it this way I think while both Europe and the US recognize that uh China’s support for Russia is helping Russia in the war and to reconstitute its military and here secretary blinkin went to The Knack briefed out um to the Press afterwards the by now famous percentages 70% Machine Tool 90% microelectronics for the Russian war effort come from CH but when they urge Europe to raise this in uh with the Chinese in Beijing where I think the Americans believe the Europeans have more leverage Europeans do that but um it’s almost raised as an issue in the bilateral relationship and then the next issue in the bilateral relationship comes up and the issue after that rather than almost putting it at the center of the agenda where the argument is you are sewing the seeds for the next great war in Europe and it will dramatically kind of filter out into all relation all aspects of our bilateral relationship do is that unfair does Europe have the urgency with China on the Russia Ukraine front that it requires I um so when the chancellor went in mid April to to Beijing uh he he delivered what I think was a very clear message and at the at the very top of the Chinese um of Chinese uh Power of the Chinese state to say in in helping Russia um in its military industrial efforts uh that that underg its its war against Ukraine China is um um what’s the right word infringing China is uh sort of hurting um German and EUR German and European core interest so the deliberately couching it in terms the Chinese regularly use in order to push back uh when we make our statements on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea international waters and all of that the this is sort of the security of Europe and the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression is a core interest uh of of Germany and Europe and uh and that is something the Chinese um need to understand I think he he made that uh unequivocally clear and that this is not something that is already priced in in you know as a as a mere loss of reputation of China in European public opinion which maybe has not gone as far downhill as it has in American public opinion but pretty far downhill uh compared to preco days so this is not already priced in if and when China continues to violate Europe’s core interest in Security on the European continent this will have an increasing cost on on China that’s the message and I think we’ll have to deliver on that message to drive sort of to make it credible to the Chinese the response we usually get from China is um you know we hear you but you have to understand uh that the Chinese Russian relationship has been difficult in the past it’s very important to be functional and uh and Cooperative today basically saying you know we’ll continue to do what we have been doing we respect the red line that we do not deliver lethal assistance to Russia’s War but anything below that threshold is fair game and we’re telling them uh you know that that can no longer be uh the measure of what is acceptable to us and it will have consequences for our relationship you can’t isolate you you can’t come to us and say this is a tragedy but none of this will affect the excellent Chinese German relationship which is the kind of message they’re trying to to take to us and we have to turn that around and say that you can’t that that cannot be compartmentalized uh if you continue to support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine that will have consequences also for our bilateral and European Chinese relationship and I think we’re in you know that may be more forcefully articulated in the United States or from us officials but I think it is a uh it is pretty much a consensus in in uh in the German government as well uh will have to translate it now into into practical steps over the next month since we have viewers from around the country on C-Span who might not be as familiar with Germany’s involvement or support for Ukraine can you talk a little bit about what Germany has done for Ukraine and why supporting Ukraine also matters to the United States or should matter to the United States well I think U the I think Ukraine’s um Independence Ukraine’s Freedom also freedom to choose its own affiliation its Alliance um should be um of of interest and of value also to the United States because if it is successfully violated um there in Central Europe uh it would set a dangerous precedent around the world um when I was in Poland uh I uh I heard that um a lot of uh um reproaches that Poland was the first to help uh Germany was a lagard in the beginning I think if you look at what we’ve done what we’ve mobilized for Ukraine over the past uh two years it’s a very significant uh effort to support on all levels military uh above all um air defense is not just uh three Patriot systems but a number of so-called Iris uh state-of-the-art air defense systems that not enough for Ukraine to to protect its cities and its critical infrastructure above all energy infrastructure but a major contribution to at least be able to defend itself against and just in recent we I think an announcement on that an announcement on the third Patriot battery to be transferred uh I think the seventh IR system but also Germany trying to lead a coalition what we called immediate action on air defense to try to mobilize with a view to the NATO Summit additional air defense batteries from around the world sort of urging Partners from uh Japan uh to Romania Netherlands all the way to the US to uh to help the ukrainians uh defend to be able to defend their critical infrastructure in order to get through the next winter uh without uh Power cuts and uh and to drive home the message to Putin that time is not on his side I think the Ukraine I think and honestly I I I will admit that uh sort of the ukrainians have proven their own agency uh uh after Russia’s aggression in a way that not only Putin had not expected but many of us didn’t either so in a way president Selinsky has managed with his team and his people to put Ukraine on our mental map in a way it was not there before uh and uh that is not only admirable but it also deserves uh support so we host up to 1.2 million Ukrainian refugees in Germany which is uh sort of one contribution uh Poland and Germany uh and the Czech Republic are the top three uh host countries for Ukrainian refugees displaced mostly from the east of Ukraine um we’ve delivered uh um tens of billions in in military aid from tanks to air defense to just about everything above all ammunition that you could think of um we’ve just held um what we what is called the Ukraine recovery conference 2024 in Berlin two weeks ago uh a major conference more than 3,000 participants uh secretary prka from the US and a major US delegation in order to not just encourage investment but in order to give Ukraine um a sense of perspective so that their news is not only about the daily fight on the front lines but it is about here’s your future as a member of the European Union as a country that can attract investment as a country that will be helped uh by its reconstruction and and uh and Recovery efforts uh I think that was a very very successful signal and we hope that the NATO Summit will will deliver its own clear message support I think it is really important to uh to to strengthen the Ukrainian position now in order then to allow the the the process that began in Switzerland with this bergenstock conference um on uh on peace for Ukraine uh to develop uh into a genuine uh diplomatic track at some point but for that Putin needs to understand that time is not on his side and uh in all honesty I not only think that there is a genuine American interest in the future of a free and independent Ukraine um but that also not only the ukrainians but also the Europeans will need continued American backing and support in order to make that happen and to ensure that that is our future one of the principal pillars of German foreign policy that we have not touched on is the European Union um in the coming days you just referenced Hungary Victor Orban takes over the European Council leadership he’s taken as his motto make Europe great again um what is happening um um within the European Union uh which is to say um As Americans I think we’ve experienced new political currents in recent years there seem to be similar ones in Europe are they related are they separate um give us just a brief uh Europe 101 if you if you can um in the context of the European Union I think we’re not I mean we’re not insulated from some of the trends that are indeed Global that uh U new Comm communication technology is changing the the the ways of political discourse in our open societies and our democracies um you can you you can watch and analyze uh the Tendencies towards polarization in in many European societies um there is a there’s a widespread uh sort of discontent um also in European societies that then translates into different political movements um so you have stronger populist parties in Europe uh as well but if you look at the if you if you look at the European elections just three weeks ago it’s as as as Europe always is it’s a you know it’s a union of 27 countries it’s a uh you have a wide spectrum uh in in Denmark the green party came out of the election suddenly as the strongest party in most of Scandinavia it was not the populists who won uh it was the moderates um in Poland uh um it was uh the center right but not the populist right that had lost the elections last Autumn and again in the European elections but in other countries and above all in France it was the populist right that and extreme right that that that carried the day in the European elections and that will create a challenge now with the French elections happening on Sunday and then the second round uh a week from from this Sunday uh and we’ll have to deal and deal with the consequences live with the consequences and and shape uh the next political consensus out of it it’s but it’s a it’s it’s like a a mobile it’s a these parts are constantly moving I don’t see them moving only in One Direction I think that they’re they’re moving in many directions at the same time and the challenge around the European Council table the table of the 27 where the 27 heads of state and government assembled yesterday to pick the new leadership team for the European uh Union uh and the European commission um uh they every time they meet every four or six weeks uh and all the other Council formations you do exactly that you’re you’re you’re constantly uh sort of shaping a new consensus that reflects the correlation of power of political power if you will on the national level uh it’s a the Italians are going to Demar you for that comment secretary B I think but no no they won’t okay um well let’s stay on U uh um on this side of the Atlantic then with the last political question and that is how Germany might see a trump presidency so uh I don’t think it’s any secret that um you’ve had excellent ties with the the Biden Administration there is a cable that suu ran I think in May um around the northstream issue where uh the embassy caed back Germany uh should be grateful because uh you know the Biden Administration is prepared to take on confrontation with Congress over this issue um Olaf Schultz sat down at the sidelines of the G7 and aulia with I think JP pugad from belou and talked about the close relations and that he thinks um president Biden can win re-election even and under President trump it was I think a tough going um I don’t think that’s any secret either do you need a trump strategy do you do you do you continue on as before trying to create more capability and ability and um and investing properly and then there’s a change of leadership it is what it is or how do you how do you think about it in Berlin well I think the the relationship with the United States in all honesty is so critically important not just to us but to basically every country around the world that I think any government would not do its proper work if it would not reflect on uh what would this scenario mean what would that scenario mean uh but that is not something that we should do or would do in public that’s something we do as a reflection process behind closed doors um this decision is up to the American people and we will work with whatever American Administration comes out of that there’s no doubt that uh we’ve worked very well we do work very well with this Administration um but it’s also true that if you look back to some of the some of the most controversial issues in the german-american relationship during the first Trump presidency uh some of that is actually not as uh not as relevant anymore and uh and some of it because we have re have had to reexamine our own assumptions Russian gas is one of them um Iran in some ways is uh is uh is another one uh I I think or 2% is a third one uh I think what would remain is certainly you know very different opinions on on trade issues and and a number of economic issues but that then is a competence of the European commission so we’re not alone uh in in our disagreement uh where it come to pass um but uh so we’ll we’ll look at that uh policy area by policy area but above all you can be sure that the one Global election that every European is watching carefully is the American election uh alas probably more so than the European Parliament election well uh when uh this opportunity was brought to me to to have you at Hudson I immediately wrote back to your team uh one of Germany’s biggest brains on foreign policy how could I resist and I think over the past hour in fact we’ve gone a little bit over an hour we’ve really uh done a tour to Horizon covering the world thank you for being so Frank and open and making this an interesting conversation thanks to all of you watching um at home and those of you at hudson. org uh you can visit our website for all of our offerings on Europe and uh really foreign policy at large I’d also encourage you to click on the link in the event announcement for this event to read uh secretary boger’s uh Washington quarterly piece that he referenced written in late 2018 for 2019 but I think a very insightful one that’s been cited many times in Think Tank discussions over the years thank you so much for being here sir and we look forward to having the Germans in town as uh an important Ally for the Washington Summit next week thank you sir thank you thank you
1 Comment
This German government is the worst thing that happened to Europe since the couple Churchill-Hitler.