In today’s video we discuss the Peterborough Overspeed Incident which occured in April of 2022 which involved a Lumo Class 803 Hitachi train. We discuss how it occured and the processes and steps that happened after the incident, we can see a train simulator recreation alongside the real CCTV footage of the incident.

    Disclaimer: All information in the video has taken from the RAIB Report which can be found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64a81bdea32f130013f068c6/R062023_230710_Peterborough.pdf

    Credit to Harry Goundry for letting me use their picture of the Class 803!

    Hope you enjoyed the newest addition to the Jakeso channel!

    Tags:

    railway,jakeso,train,overspeed,train overspeed,class 803,hitachi,IET,Lumo,First Group,First Group Lumo,train incident,RAIB,RAIB Report,peterborough,peterborough train station,peterborough overspeed,rail accident,RAIB Investigation,RAIB Peterborough,Newcastle,London Kings Cross,investigation

    On the 17th of April 2022 a normal spring morning in the county of Cambridge was about to become the center of attention for the railway the time is 8:20 in the morning and one of first group’s lumo Services departs from new gastle for London Kings Cross operating under the head code 1

    Yankee 80 the unit taken is one of five class 803 electric multiple units built by Tachi in 2020 the service was operating normally and made its way down the East Coast Mainline with no problems around 2 hours later at 10:15 one Yankee 80 is approaching peterb station this

    Service was not due to stop at peterb one Yankee 80 is currently running 4 minutes early however following behind was one Yankee 16 an lnr service which was running 21 minutes late in an attempt to recover time for the delayed one Yankee 16 the signal and made the

    Choice to oververt one Yankee 80 onto the up slot line as opposed to the up fast line which it was intended to go down one Yankee 80 would then rejoin the up fast line after passing the station allowing one Yankee 16 to overtake one Yankee 80 as one Yankee 16 was supposed

    To be ahead of one Yankee 80 but this was not true as a result of the delay on approach the Peter foration one Yanke 80 encountered a preliminary caution signal and and then a caution signal from Papa 474 signal at 17 minutes past 10 the unit slowed down to around 32 mph slowing

    Down and passing Papa 474 at this time one Yankee 80 was now approaching Papa 468 signal which was showing a danger aspect the 10sec timer began which would release Papa 468 signal from danger to proceed after the 10 seconds had elapsed after this time Papa 46 signal

    Cleared with a route indicator on to Platform One on the up Slow line several moments later the aspect changed from danger to proceed the driver then took power placing the traction controller into full power one Yankee 80 is now entering spal Junction to the north of Peter station still building up

    Incredible speeds only 3 seconds before the incident the driver noticed that the banner repeat of a platform three which rooted the up fast line was on meaning the next signal on that line Papa 440 was at danger at this moment the train was routed off the up fast line during

    The diverging line at 76 mph three times over the speed limit of the points that was 25 mph the class 03 launched to the left as the forces being applied on the train were extremely intense we can observe the speed that the train was traveling through the CCTV footage of one Yan 80

    Which was released to the public the driver placed the train into emergency at this time exiting the points and joining the up Slow line still traveling at around 60 mph in the passenger compartments luggage was thrown from the racks and some passengers were thrown around the saloon one Yankee 80

    Screeched to a halt at Platform One moments later immediately the driver of one Yankee 80 contacted the signal reporting that a major overp speed had just occurred and requesting that the signal in front Papa 436 be set to Danger while the driver composed themselves as they were fairly shaken

    From the incident the driver was unaware at this moment that pea 468 had indicated a diversion to the UPS Slow line and was very confused about what had occurred the passengers were checked on by customer ambassadors at peterb and some minor injuries were reported an off-duty driver who was traveling on the

    Service at the time helped the driver to assess the damage of which none was found transparan Express control staff who act as lumo’s control requested the off-duty driver take over operations from the other driver this was done and the service departed peterb at 11:45 to complete its journey to London Kings

    Cross the customer ambassadors were encouraged to listen out for any unusual noise of vibration as the journey continued the British transport police met passengers and crew at London Kings Cross who took statements and breath alized the tested the driver for alcohol and drugs following this the unit was

    Taken to bounds green Depot for examination but miraculously no damage was found which was also the case for the points on the junction where the overs speed had occurred now we must ask what caused this potentially fatal accident the RAB found that the immediate cause was the

    Fact that one Yanke 80 passed over The Junction at excessive speed because the driver controlled the speed under the assumption that the train would stay on the up fast line it was noted that the driver’s awareness of the signal conditions were not sufficient enough it was believed that the driver simply did

    Not see the junction indicator instead seeing the proed aspect another reason could be the fact that the signal cycle did not operate as it usually would in normal cases on approach platform one or two the signals coming before Papa 468 would present flashing yellow and double yellow signals to indicate a large

    Decrease in the speed limit in this case from 125 mph to 25 mph this would give drivers enough time to slow their train and recognize that they would be rooted in into the slow lines however as there was a train occupying the signal block ahead it was not possible it is thought

    That this could have contributed to the incident however this was not a fault of the signaling system or the signaler we can observe in this layout how the junction should have operated under normal conditions however this is how it operated due to the train ahead it was

    Noted that lumo had failed to correctly train their drivers to correctly manage signal aspects lumo disagreed with this stating that this was because this could lead to a driver making assumptions about how the signal could change and could lead to errors involving anticipation and assumption it was also

    Noted that lumo did not assess the risks associated with Trains being unexpectedly rooted onto a slower diverging route the driver was found to be fully competent and had been qualified for around 2 months at this time the incident was treated with the upmost severity especially considering the fact the simulation showed that the

    Train was dangerously close to over turning at that speed with thoughts that the wheels most likely momentarily lifted from the track when crossing the junction following the incident the driver was retrained and reassessed and was back on duty as of July 2023 when the report was published lumo’s route

    Learning was enhanced all drivers were briefed post incident measures were modified and Luggage handling was modified as a result unfortunately this would not be the last time an incident occurred here as just over a year later a Grand Central class 180 did the exact same thing which is currently under

    Investigation the incident demonstrates the importance of understanding signals and rout indicators to prevent incidents like this as everyone was very lucky that the train did not overturn during this incident it demonstrates why training is Paramount and briefing your drivers correctly should always be the priority for

    14 Comments

    1. Strongest message out of this and the similar Grand Central incidents is that when drivers sign for route knowledge it is supposed to cover ALL lines in that route including ALL aspects that signals are capable of displaying.

      It's very worrying that these drivers appear to have 'conditioned' themselves into believing that they wouldn't ever be routed via a platform line at Peterborough (and indeed other stations with similar layouts where they're not booked to call), so that despite having several seconds' reading time of P468's feather as well as green aspect it failed to register in their minds. TOCs have slimmed down driver training courses over the years, and it's hard to avoid the conclusion that this contributed.

      Peterborough is not Paddington, but its layout is pretty complex. Have the lessons of Ladbroke Grove been forgotten?

    2. The fact that it happened again, indicates that there is a signalling problem at this location. The diverging signal should be held at single yellow, or even a speed approach controlled red.

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