REDEFINICJA WSPÓŁPRACY POLSKO-NIEMIECKIEJ W DZIEDZINIE BEZPIECZEŃSTWA

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[ENGLISH VERSION BELOW]

Lata 90. cechowała pogłębiona współpraca polsko-niemiecka obejmująca bezpieczeństwo – zarówno Niemcy, tuż po zjednoczeniu, jak i Polska po transformacji 1989 roku próbowały wypracować wspólną percepcję wyzwań zmieniającego się świata. Mnogość inicjatyw, jak ta z 1994 roku na wyspie Bornholm, szkolenie polskich oficerów, czy symboliczne gesty jak wsparcie Niemiec podczas akcesji Polski do Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego napawały nadzieją na pogłębione relacje. Z czasem jednak relacje te ewoluowały we wzajemną podejrzliwość – wspólnota interesów coraz bardziej przypominała wspólnotę sprzeczności. Czy Polskę i Niemcy łączy coś jeszcze w sferze bezpieczeństwa, poza członkostwem w strukturach NATO i polskimi zakupami niemieckiego sprzętu po Bundeswehrze?

W rozmowie poświęconej kondycji polsko-niemieckich relacji udział wzięli:

👉 dr Beata Górka-Winter – analityk, doktor nauk społecznych w zakresie nauk o polityce, adiunkt na Wydziale Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych UW,

👉 dr Krzysztof M. Zalewski – ekspert ds. polityki zagranicznej. Od 2023 r. prezes Zarządu Instytutu Boyma,

👉 Paweł Behrendt – analityk ds. Obronności oraz Dalekiego Wschodu (Chiny i Japonia) Instytutu Boyma. Doktorant na wydziale Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Wiedeńskiego,

🎙️ Prowadzi Gabriela Masztafiak – Nowa Konfederacja

DYSKUSJA ODBYŁA SIĘ W RAMACH PROJEKTU REALIZOWANEGO PRZEZ NOWĄ KONFEDERACJĘ, FUNDACJĘ WSPÓŁPRACY POLSKO-NIEMIECKIEJ ORAZ EUROPA-UNION DEUTSCHLAND e.V.

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#Polska #Niemcy #armia #Bundeswehra #wojskopolskie

***
The 1990s were characterized by deepened Polish-German cooperation involving security – both Germany, just after reunification, and Poland after the 1989 transition tried to develop a common perception of the challenges of a changing world. A multitude of initiatives, such as the one in 1994 on the island of Bornholm, the training of Polish officers, or symbolic gestures like Germany’s support during Poland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty fueled hopes for deeper relations. Over time, however, these relations evolved into mutual suspicion – the community of interests increasingly resembled a community of contradictions. Do Poland and Germany have anything else in common in the security sphere, besides membership in NATO structures and Polish purchases of German equipment after the Bundeswehr?

The conversation on the condition of the German army included:

👉 Dr. Beata Gorka-Winter – analyst, PhD in political science, assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the UW,

👉 Dr. Krzysztof M. Zalewski – foreign policy expert. President of the Board of Directors of the Boym Institute since 2023,

👉 Pawel Behrendt – analyst for Defense and the Far East (China and Japan) at the Boym Institute. PhD student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna,

🎙️ Host Gabriela Masztafiak – Nowa Konfederacja

THE DISCUSSION HAPPENED UNDER THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTED BY THE NEW CONFEDERATION, THE FOUNDATION OF POLISH-GERMAN COOPERATION AND EUROPA-UNION DEUTSCHLAND e.V.

This basic discrepancy at the level of vision of how we should treat Russia, to what level we in general with Russia we should cooperate with is, after all, completely still next door the entire energy sector, where also we actually have total, divergent visions on how to shape the

Our energy mix to precisely not be dependent on Russia, to Russia didn’t just have leverage on us, and Germany took a completely different path. The question is in what formats we should talk to Germany. Because, of course, there is the issue of bilateral and there is the issue of different kinds of

Triangles, well, primarily the Weimar Triangle, there are also regional issues and it seems to me that we should take more advantage of the fact that the we lie on a common sea, we have such a Mare Nostrum Baltic. Now our common, perhaps

Almost natal, with a small stretch of relatively Russian coastline, but also so here we have cooperation with Germany, which is also a Baltic state, With Denmark, Sweden, Finland should also be our priority here. Mid-June Germany has published its first-ever national security strategy. And of course, to make things even more

Interesting, this is a strategy prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, led by the hawkish Annalena Bearbock next door for some. But what is important about the strategy, Germany is beginning to say language that is more understandable, more acceptable in Poland. This material was also created thanks to New Confederation donors.

If you want such completely independent analyses of matters of strategic importance continued to emerge, please consider joining the ranks of New Confederation donors. Bartłomiej Radziejewski. Good morning, I welcome you very much cordially in the next debate organized by the New Confederation and the

Foundation for Polish-German cooperation in a series of debates devoted to the in fact, the German-Polish relationship, whether in the security field or in the the field of bilateral relations, trade relations. So far, we’ve also talked a bit about historical issues. And today we’ll talk about how the

Currently, security cooperation precisely between Poland and the Germany and we will analyze lightly what happened and in history, what we are dealing with now, but we are also tempted to make a small prediction about it, what Polish-German cooperation might look like in the coming years.

My name is Gabriela Masztafiak and I have the pleasure of speaking with the following guests today. I extend a warm welcome to Dr. Beata Górka-Winter. Ms. D. is an analyst, assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Analysts you know,

Commentator on many of our discussions. Hello Dr. Krzysztof Zalewski, a regular contributor to the New Confederation, and an expert on the subject Foreign Policy from 2023, Chairman of the Board of the Boym Institute. Warm welcome. Good morning to you, good morning to You. And I also welcome Mr. Paweł Behrendt,

Mr. Paweł Berendth is a defense and Far Eastern affairs analyst at the Institute of Boym, as well as a commentator known to you a specialist in European-Asian affairs. More than once in our pages, welcome. Good morning. Dear all, in connection with the fact that I mentioned at the beginning that we will talk

Today about defense cooperation on the line of Poland Germany, I will be tempted to say the following a few words of introduction related to such certain historical issues, because the we are actually more than 30 years since the official after the fall of communism in Poland, after the reunification of Germany, we reconnected

Cooperation in various fields between Poland and Germany. Several important ones can be mentioned here documents, such as the treaty on mutual cooperation between Poland and Germany, as border treaty between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. And all this led us to tighten,

Strengthening mutual ties in areas that, after the 1990s, constituted a very key issues in the development of both Poland, Poland and Germany. In contrast, today, in 2023, we are talking in a slightly different reality. We have been talking as I mentioned, for 30 years now after these relationships were established.

Over the years we have observed A growing community of mutual interests, but also referred to by many as a a community of contradictions and community of interests and divergent interests. And today I would like to share with you talk about it, ask Ms. Beata Górka-Winter.

This is what we have left of this defense cooperation today. Of course we are both Poland and Germany members of very important international alliances organizations, like the European Union, like the North Atlantic Treaty. But beyond these areas of cooperation are we connected by any bilateral, bilateral projects? Relations between Poland and Germany?

Yes, of course they connect us. And now I would like to emphasize right away that in general, however, it is always better than this we hear in the media. Because, however, this world of the military, where we have scheduled various types of exercises or international cooperation under various types of

Commands, so or so, as I said, different kinds of cooperation at lower levels of the military is usually something that is planned for years or develops as needed. As for the military level, here they usually do not reach it such major political or even ideological disputes,

I would say, which reach us from the media. Of course, the conflict in Ukraine has shown how this cooperation is in effect. What are its limitations. And these limitations are not because I don’t know do we have bad relations or are these relations somehow cool. On the other hand, these limitations are

Simply due to the condition of the army and the German and Polish and also from the different directions we have actually taken. And now, as Ukraine has shown, Ukraine showed what we already knew in principle for a long time, but this, so to speak, well, it has become quite obvious.

That Germany has been neglecting it’s defense sector for very many years. And now going forward, it is difficult to plan any very in-depth cooperation with a state that either sees differently its development precisely in terms of security and defense, and it is different to plan with a country

That has similar thinking and similar directions. And here is what stands in the way of this bilateral cooperation, it is not that we have, that we are somehow inclined, whether we have colder these relationships, only these are structural problems. And now what is, what lies within the scope of these problems?

First of all, the fact that it has been very difficult over the past few years to force Germany and that you know, the state, well, Poland has here little leverage in this area, so that force a much larger European country to take action, however,

Which it does not want to undertake, because it does not see such legitimacy. And why doesn’t he see such legitimacy? Because he has a completely different vision of threats. And in fact, until the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Germany had a different vision of the threats.

Even if somewhere in the NATO forum we agreed on certain benchmarks or as to certain visions, which countries threaten us, which phenomena are uncomfortable for us and may end up, for example the outbreak of war. Then even if at this level German politicians were swayed by the

Heads, however, it was clear in practice that they were thinking about something else entirely. And here you mentioned this community of interest. I actually tried myself before Record imagine what this community is like. And of course today we are in this moment that we can already start imagining it slowly, but

On the other hand, before the outbreak of war in Ukraine we actually had very few points in common. Germany did not believe that Russia would attack Ukraine. In view of this, they led in every field, whether in terms of energy, whether it is in a social sense such policies that completely do not

Assumed such a scenario and such a development. In the same way, sorry to interrupt, but I would like to clarify one point. You are talking about a completely different threat perception, a completely different redirection attention to ensure, to ensure security between Poland and Germany. But at the same time, after all, Germany

Was such an ardent advocate of Poland’s entry into the NATO structures, if only by the very fact that they perceived the then Russia and the eastern flank, the European flank, as a threat to itself. Then what? Our perceptions of security only get closer when it comes to the big ones

Conflicts like the fall of the Soviet Union, now the war in Ukraine? No, no, it’s not that nature in general. Naturally, the Germans and this, by the way, was explained to us during the years of the 2000s and even earlier, in the 1990s. That too, let’s not be such idealists.

Germany was well aware that if Central European countries will remain in this security grey zone, that is, they will not properly belong either to the East, which has gone its own way, or to the West, is the number of phenomena of various kinds, including pathological ones.

We know what those early 1990s were like when we didn’t really have that hard a vision of it yet. I’m especially talking about the very beginning of the 1990s. It is known that for Germany it was better to have neighbor, which will be integrated into Western structures, which will be

Had a security sector, because that’s what it’s all about here in the first place, the reforming the security sector to meet NATO standards. And here is where Germany’s policy is quite pragmatic. That’s why I say we shouldn’t be such idealists. For every country

A very pragmatic approach is for his neighbor to share the same values in various spheres, but in the sphere of security and defense as well, so that it simply does not generate all sorts of problems. Why was Poland such, is such an advocate for Ukraine? For the same reason,

That we would prefer to see the Ukrainian state as a stable, reformed state, with a security sector, where we can conduct cooperation with them precisely on this defense level, rather than a state that generates all sorts of pathologies that however, they will also always be our problem to some degree.

So Germany’s policy there at the time was very pragmatic. This later spread, because such, that, first of all, it was enough for the Germans that Poland was in the NATO was already behind Ukrainian affairs not so much. We were that country, that locomotive, which tried to draw Ukraine into NATO.

Second divergence of interests. Poland has always seen Russia as a threat, even in those times when the even before Georgia, Russia had not shown such aggressive actions. Germany, on the other hand, has always perceived Russia, wanted to perceive Russia, it may have been very idealistic, but it was also

Business, of course, as a valuable partner first and foremost. There was always a lot of faith there that Russia was modernizing, that Russia would go the way of the democratic reforms that it’s security sector would also follow such a path. So here the total divergence of vision was

After all, visible at every turn, and any discussion with the Germans on the subject that we have a very dangerous neighbor in the East, which will potentially generate huge problems for us in terms of security in the Germany, unfortunately, was not met with understanding, even.

Well I remember those discussions with German analysts when we made an attempt to translations to Germany, after all, Germany was going very far in this cooperation with Russia. The Germans were building a sector for the Russians rebar, they supplied, built mulina, provided training, so, so, in fact, they contributed to the Russian

The armed forces were becoming stronger, which for us was a absolute aberration and we knew that sooner or later it would end for us, for the West somehow a disaster, which we could not explain to our German partners for a very long time. Here is the discrepancy itself.

I don’t know if I’m articulating it well, while this basic discrepancy on the the level of vision of how we should treat Russia, to which level we should cooperate with Russia at all is, after all, completely still next to the whole energy sector, where also properly.

We have total, divergent visions on how to shape the our energy mix to precisely not be dependent on Russia, to Russia had no leverage on us. Germany took a completely different path. So that’s the problem. The problem is not, I don’t know, organizing exercises or getting along

As for some, let’s say, smaller, finer initiatives. The problem is a complete divergence of vision of how we see threats to NATO, and here it is indeed very difficult, it was very difficult to find until the outbreak of war, find such a plane, on which we could build something bigger with Germany

And here bilateral. Here what you are talking about, very much resonates with what years ago Mr. Former ambassador to Germany, Mr. Janusz Reiter, who stated that the convergence of interests has become a political fact, must be realized, accepted and formulated on both sides. And here indeed

It seems to me that this realization and acceptance above all the wording on both sides may be somewhat lacking. But we are also talking about it here, what in Poland, what from the perspective of Warsaw from our perception, security we could expect in relation to Germany.

I would like to turn to Dr. Krzysztof Zalewski and also use the another such quote no longer from Ambassador Reiter, but of former Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who such very interesting words he delivered at the Western Institute in 2008, which says this precisely in the context of a certain formulation of our expectations

According to Germany. He said that Poland in addition to political and historical reconciliation, expects Germany to be a partner in dialogue of a strategic nature along the lines of German-French relations. At the same time, we see that these Polish relations German is characterized by a very high asymmetry in terms of

Not only about the potential of the two countries, but also about such mutual perceptions of each other. In the economic domain, in the security domain. If we could characterize how these Polish-German relations shaping up at this point? Do we even talk to each other about Formulating some mutual interests, expectations?

Are we developing the platforms for dialogue we have between Poland and Germany? Doctor? I would focus on the security domain. This is important, while she does not function in a vacuum. It seems to me that we must realize that certain things must be resolved, i.e. I witnessed

One discussion, in which a very German journalist asked at a recent conference of some German participants, of the Polish participants, which can actually solve or what Germany might normally be about. The Polish participant there replied that it was also about the issue of reparations and that’s where we need to start.

So these are some issues that can divide us a lot. And the question is, how will we manage to end this issue? Some creativity is needed here, because I can’t imagine that Germany paid war reparations and also paid to some groups of victims during World War II, individual reparations.

It is possible to talk about some kind of reparation, but still, in order to move with some sort of Polish-German agenda, then the area must be cleared. When it comes to the issue of just atonement for the past, because otherwise she will save our relationships.

We got a response from the German Foreign Ministry last year, that the issue of reparations is closed, only it is closed, but for whom and on what level is it? This is the very question of what do we expect? And it seems to me that with the expectations of Polish society measured

Surveys that some form of reparation is due to us at around 60-70%. I cannot imagine that simply any Polish government this issue raised by the current government simply left. And it probably wouldn’t be specifically either good. That this issue must be dealt with in any way.

It is to escape to a comparison that can show that these issues are not so strange, because the war ended almost 80 years ago, but the Koreans and Japanese continue to have trouble with it, with this legacy and in various creative ways are currently trying to defuse such issues.

And it seems to me that here you also need the creativity of diplomats Polish industry and the German government to clean it up. The second issue is this question of what formats we should talk to Germany. Because, of course, there is the bilateral issue, is the issue of various types of

Triangles, most notably the Weimar Triangle. There are also regional issues, and it seems to me that we should take more advantage of the fact that we lie on a common sea. We have such Mare Nostrum Baltic, now we have our common sea, almost NATO-like, with a small stretch of relatively Russian coastline.

But also so here we have cooperation with Germany, which is also a Baltic state, With Denmark, Sweden, Finland should also be our priority here. I think this is important and good for us, because we don’t need to talk to the Germans one-to-one. And I imagine that the Nordic, northern

Countries may have a similar perception of the threats, which is exactly what we do when it comes to the Baltic issue. So undertaking such minilateral, not real, not multilateral, but such bilateral ones. A plane of dialogue with Germany would be some solution. I think, returning to the issue of reparations

Creatively think about what kind of offer to make to our German partners to get funding for the various projects we need, and to settle historical issues in the process. And here, if I may indulge in such a minor brainstorm, perhaps it would be good, for example, to propose a

Expansion of the European Defense Fund and that this money, which, for example Germany would need to give back to us, it would not give back to us as war reparations, but as an investment in a common European future, a secure future. And the European Fund

Defense, not necessarily this institution here I say in certain quotation marks, Would invest in military capabilities, especially of countries vulnerable to the danger of frontline European Union countries. I imagine that currently treaty-based is difficult, aut it would be conceivable that a country such as, for example

Germany, which does not want to expand on its own it’s own armed forces, seemingly investing, but somehow not really fast and not very deep could have as an alternative state financial support through a European mechanism that has defense needs that it cannot finance on its own.

We must also make it clear to ourselves that our defense needs are so great, that we need to think about how, where to get this money. And I think we should engage in dialogue with Germany precisely in this spirit, to solve common problems and seek funding for projects that would make these

Problems somehow solved, or as it is now said disorderly address. Well, that’s what we could also go back to some good models from the past, as one can recall here, for example. The year 94, when a meeting of foreign ministers took place on the island of Bornholm

Poland, Denmark, Germany, who actually established then they laid such a foundation for the creation of the multinational North East Corps. It is precisely given this commonality of interests of both Europe Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic precisely. If I may, sorry to say,

Because we have to realize that we live in a slightly different reality than 50 years in the year, of course, but it’s more dangerous. This is true, but on the other hand, however, it is much better. From our point of view, it’s safer in the Baltic because we still have additional

Two countries, almost two, one and a half, because this Sweden, however, one foot is NATO. And it seems to me that here Together with Germany, we should use the potential of Finland and Sweden, which entered, will hopefully enter NATO, the two countries that have a very modern armed forces, differently organized than ours.

And that can really be a big potential. And perhaps this is just such a suggestion for what you might want to think about. How to solve common problems that go beyond bilateral problems, i.e. I thnik about where to get soldiers or female soldiers

And how to convince young people to serve in the military. And here it seems to me that cooperation with northern Europe would perhaps be inspiring. Northern Europe, which is able to mobilize very, very numerous armed forces compared to the number of inhabitants. Dr. Górka-Winter I see has raised her hand.

You are very welcome, doctor. Yes, I wanted a little just by the way of details, because of course we can postulate what Mr. Krzysztof suggests. Yes, this is a very good idea in general. It has been operating in the public space for some time already,

That if not reparations, then more money from Germany for funds defense, for joint projects in the field of armaments. Only, of course, the devil is in the details. And now if we go through ourselves one by one and these arms programs we are talking about in Europe,

This is what I looked at for myself for the purpose of this play. Well, domains, of course, because that’s the easiest way. And now in the area of missile defense we were not willing, and rightly so, as the war in Ukraine showed, to wait for it,

Until some major European initiatives emerge, which of course arose one day with all the strength of these initiatives – European Sky Shield. And now it will be difficult. Poland is, of course, criticized for not wanting to be part of this project. This is used in some political debate, political struggle.

On the other hand, the truth is that we already today, that we this kind of the need we have seen for a very long time, after all, we have seen back in 2005, the first negotiations with the Americans began, I remind. So obviously the configuration of this system

For that moment was to be different, then by American decisions and also ours, through a process of many years of discussions with the Americans, who turned out to be, in fact, plus the British, the only reliable partners, because the European countries, after all, were such. I wrote texts about it myself that

We should develop this program, moreover that NATO should be a partner. The Germans at the time were very critical more maybe France. Yes, we talked about it yesterday, than Germany, but there was criticism of Poland that we so very much with the Americans we are united

By such strong ties that it makes us in general antagonize the European allies. So one may ask oneself how one can was when we proposed just such cooperation in the European forum. Not only was there no interest, but there was even criticism that we wanted to expand this program.

And today, when this program materialized, at least in such a design layer that they want it create, well we are, however, say light years ahead, advanced. And now it will be neither cost-effective nor rational in the sense. Because what’s different is to buy a batch of tanks

And adapt in some way to make them function in the Polish army. And what is different is to make a delineation of the architecture of the defense system anti-missile, make it’s integration, find partners, build the platform, fix it, attach the rockets and still all this

Encapsulate a great many elements that are not talked about on a daily basis. But this is really a very high level of complication. And now I don’t understand this criticism, especially on the part of the experts, because, after all, it also appears. That we at this time will not drop everything and go

To the European program, which is really supposed to be based on that anyway, that the base for it is to be the Israel system, which means it is also a buy equipment from Israel. It remains to be seen how it will work out, as Israel today has its own problems, so the

We’ll see if it makes any sense at all. Many countries are also already sort of giving up on this idea, so when it comes to these systems, well, here for us, right, like joining it, well, I don’t know, maybe in the role of an observer. It’s what

I would suggest, for the reason that, well, it is also worth watching, What the European partners here, what concepts they have, what they have to offer. We can also give you some advice, because we are already there in a situation where we can too, we can be the advisor, because this program

Is really well developed. To this issue and such a very Germany’s assertive security policy toward NATO, too, because it over the years, over the years we have been able to observe between among others expressed in Germany’s refusal to participate in the Iraq mission. Yes, that’s exactly what these

Differences in security perceptions, but also accusations against Poland that by accession to the missile shield program wants to disrupt the gravity of the forces is being pulled away from us. What the charges were. And he wants to upset the balance of zoning in Europe.

But if you allow me, I’ll go over for a moment to Mr. Pawła Bherendt and we will return to this issue later disparities in security assessments. I would like to confront Mr. Paweł with such a question. We very often talk about the fact that in Poland our international relations are dictated by current

Politics and are often related to who happens to be in power in Poland. In short. But as the cycle of these debates goes on, we also somewhat try to understand Germany and what is happening on the German political scene. I, for one, would like to ask you about

Institutional continuity and this approach to the Polish-German relations on the German side as well. Because this is customary, it is said in our country, but this is also confirmed by the facts that. For example Germany’s SPD party was much less willing to irritate Russia and

Spoil relations with it than, for example, the CDU, CSU coalition. Could we step into these German mantras for a moment politics and look at German-Polish relations from her perspective? Because we know that federal elections in Germany are coming up. I went to the general federal election in Germany is two more

Years closer there are several land choices and this should be our starting point, because let’s remember that in addition to this is the policy pursued by Berlin there are also land policies. In the 1990s, this was the case for the neighboring state of Brandenburg, Poland

Very much precisely for Polish-German rapprochement did SPD politicians. In short, in this first period they were in many fields much more active than CDW, CSU not to mention the liberals. And right here let’s go back to what previous speakers said. In Germany, there is definitely

Much more solid continuity, constitutional continuity than in Poland. On the other hand, there is the same process as with us. Foreign policy has simply become a function of domestic policy, which in fact, is maybe the case of Poland is a lot

Less used in this bouncing ball in the Bundestag and the Federal Government. Much more, much more important countries are the already mentioned Russia, there is China, the United States, France, but after it’s 1998, 1999, sorry, Poland joins NATO. In 2004, it joins the Union. In short, these goals

German policy toward Poland are realized, the bottom line. And in short, everything, You leave more with the conviction that it should be a self-player by now. Poland is relegated to the background, there are other factors, especially the very discrepancies the ladies were talking about.

I would still add here so ad vocem I would not define the policy Germany within NATO, because over the past 20 years as some kind of particularly assertive was simply obstruction and passive resistance. First of all, passive resistance. No and no more. For this also partly projected

Relations with Poland. That we are again entering the national policy stage, where Berlin rarely looks to the East, at least the one closer to it. This is not only about Poland, but also the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, for example. With land governments, on the other hand, this also varies.

In Brandenburg itself, there are jokes that the Potsdam, with is capitol of land says, or the state capital Berlin obscures the view to the eas and in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is a Schwerig looking primarily north toward Denmark. (?) – tu sprawdź od 36 minuty And here it is

Further divergence, because in turn the counties and border municipalities are much more interested in cooperation with Poland, even if it goes in contrast to federal and land policy. So we need to keep in mind these different levels of German politics, which often eludes us.

Germany is a federal state and in the full sense of the word. Now. again, other changes began. It is very popular to dump problems in Polish-German relations of the last eight years on the Polish government, which is also not entirely true. There is much of the blame is on both sides.

Anyway, in 2018 a German journalist Christoph von Marshall published a fantastic book on. “Wir verstehen die Welt nicht mehr. Deutschlands Entfremdung von seinen Freunden” That is, we no longer understand the world from Germany’s friendship, from its allies. Where as part of a research program funded by the organized by the

George Marshall Fund, Mr. von Marshall had a whole series of conversations with politicians and experts from Poland, France and the United States. Identify three key partners for Poland, for Germany. And the very conclusions were devastating for Berlin. In short, German politicians have begun to

Speak a completely different language from not only Poles, but also French and Americans, which made cooperation very difficult. Although in the German expert bubble there has been a great deal of criticism of what Berlin is doing. And again we have what was in our

Previous debate this bucket of cold water or even Ice Bucket Challenge for Germany’s political class, which began learning the language of Grand Strategy geopolitics again. Such a tough policy of defining interests not only in the context of the economic, but precisely political, strategic and military. Fact, in some groups it goes quite smoothly.

Here we can say about the greens, who are an incredible surprise. It’s looking pretty good for the FDP, CDu, CSU benefits from being in opposition. In contrast, it looks very different in SPD. Doctor, I see that Dr. Zalewski has raised his hand.

I, before I give the floor here, would like to ask you one more question. Here we will combine the two issues, because we talked earlier about the fact that we are already completely different times. I referred to the 1990s, but I think that even three years ago, if

We had talked, we can already talk about the the fact that we are at a completely different point in history. On the other hand, since Germany is in the time after the bucket of cold water, after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, then maybe we

We need a whole new opening in these German-Polish relations and we simply need to make new friends with these Germans. Since Mr. Paweł said a moment ago that the Germans were somewhat friendly with the entire world and are somewhat searching for an idea of themselves from scratch.

Although it would be the best option for me to interject my two cents. Doctor, go ahead. Well, that is the question, to what extent Germany is even at its turning point. Because they have their own. All this Zeitenwende, Mr. Doctor, well. Yes, but not only that. Not always as we would like.

I mean, first of all, this is German society is accustomed to low and stable prices. Because there increases they are fear of inflation is one of society’s main fears. Accordingly and the energy crisis for them last year and this year is a big one political challenge, on which capitalism also has fringe parties.

And it seems to me that such a party as a The AFD alternative to Germany is just growing in strength. Proposing, of course irrational solutions to these problems, but somehow this public anger they embody. We have a new political party one of and former left-wing

Is establishing a party that will appeal to both right and left voters. And both of these parties, and Linke, and Alternative Land, and in this party and the new one, the new movement is afraid. We also have Zeitenwende in Germany. Not only as those big investments in

Defense, which, to be honest, has not yet occurred. We’ll see what comes of it, because for now Germany, when it comes to spending, rather reproduces those military capabilities or those purchases they make to other countries, i.e. How will they send 20 or 12 tanks

Leopard to Ukraine, then they also order little more or the same amount. As a result, it is not known how it is Zeitenwende in defense, but we know that Zeitenwende the one for Germany is likely coming and for their political system. This, in my opinion, is the moment for us as Europeans and

Primarily Poles, a very sensitive moment. And it seems to me that it is unclear how much the German political system will change. But there is a danger that if we have become accustomed to German stability, that this stability or to the fact that we have partners the same for many years in the

Different institutions and at different different levels, this may begin to change. In this sense, Germans can take a pass on Polonia. If I may say so, it means that their institutions and their system will be more flexible or one that is more amenable to change.

This can have both good things and not so good things for us. And if I may return to the question, to what you said Doctor is, of course, I’m not talking about as for the community’s proposals, joint European projects, o developing, for example Iron Shield security shield over Europe.

I would rather think about going towards the new instruments together with Germany, using their Zeitenwende especially in defense and think about creating new European funds along the lines of, I don’t know, from the Cohesion Community funds, although that countries that are under threat or are border states of the Union

European, could have had separate funds for their armaments needs. That is I think we should come up with a way in which Europe, meaning Poland and Germany each other will invest in military capabilities, i.e. if Poland needs 1000 tanks, for example, and there is nothing to buy them with,

Then we are not talking about making Europeans, other Germans pay for the salaries or tributes to Polish soldiers, but so that we can apply for money for this type of acquisition of this type of capability or this type of equipment.

And because we need to find a way to the hole between our capabilities and the our needs, I think it should be very Berlin and Brussels very clearly stated. Because it seems to me that such is our national pride or the pride of members of the previous government that everything

We are able to pay ourselves, is unjustified. It seems to me that it was a very important a breakthrough in thinking and in Europe about security. And we should also act on it, if we are in such again

Zeitenwende not only in Germany, not only in Poland, perhaps, but also in Europe in the in general, as the discussion of treaties enters, we must also think about how to change this European architecture or practice to it better responded to our security interests.

Doctor then we have a quote in Germany We haveclearly, we have 100 billion euros on the table Fund, which was announced by Chancellor Chancellor Olaf Scholz. So far, we’ve talked about what in what we experienced this discrepancy interests, among other things, the attitude toward Russia, among other things, the place of relations

Transatlantic in this European security architecture. Germany’s opposition to a missile shield in Poland. Then we have the reality of 2023, 100 billion euros on the table. And how, then, could we look for such ways to make sure that together with the

Germany were able to build something on this plane of security Mulino 2.0? This German-Russian training center? No, I think, of course, that within NATO it is the only path for us to strengthen all these initiatives and have implemented what both the Vilnius Summit and all previous decisions brought.

I am, of course, talking about strengthening troops on the eastern flank, but here it’s already a very big job for Germany, because we talked about it yesterday, that their negligence, well, and of course, ours too, well. Because it’s not like that we were exclusively ahead during the last decade

Also scattered our efforts a bit, as we had to send a lot of soldiers to the missions, and this required a completely different effort military than building capabilities of a conventional nature here. So naturally for both countries, but also regionally, as someone mentioned, it requires construction, further interoperability and implementation of these plans

Regional, which are, after all, at the moment ‘in the making’. So for the military here this cooperation is clearly delineated and here there is generally no some room for interpretation, whether, should or shouldn’t. These policy decisions in this regard have already been made. On the other hand, when it comes to

Further searching for fields of cooperation, the I not only because I teach at the university and work a lot with the youth, but because I really see the potential for cooperation. We should definitely start this rapprochement right here intensify, because this cooperation has always been a youth exchange

Poland-Germany in various formats or various foundations have been involved. On the other hand, what I I have been advocating for very many years in various publications, that is, the construction of a Polish somehow maybe at the MFA, whether the formula here is perhaps secondary.

On the other hand, for this we need funds of such a formula to invite more and more people from Germany to us to show them, the way we think here and they are very interested in it, because I in every

Semester I have students from Germany and you can see that they are coming to Poland with some beliefs that have little to do with the real Poland. And it’s only been weeks and months in residence here allow them to verify what they came with. These beliefs, stereotypes that are built somewhere in them.

We know how Germans interpret different things for different reasons. And how they present at least historical issues. And it is only here that a certain verification of what many stereotypes they came with. And now the students are one level. The second level, and these are really very cool, young people,

Educated people, very open to discussion. So I would really invest here gros of resources into making this youth cooperation happen. And also remember that the more of these people come to Poland and leave from here with a good impression, the later it will pay off in building future elites.

Because these people will go into politics and business somewhere later. And we will already have these ties tightened and this field of mental cooperation also developed. The second group that I see, with which actually we do not invest at all, these are young journalists. And here I don’t just mean Germany,

It will be both France and the United Kingdom, and ultimately the United States. We should invite to Poland not only journalists who, you know, well, already have 20, 30 years in the profession, they have their convictions. Whatever happens, this opinion is hard to change. Well, because if someone has already

Formed a certain worldview over how many decades, then also difficult to make any significant modifications. But young journalists should be shown our truth. And let’s recall that we all live in an era of massive disinformation. Much of this disinformation is being built up by Russia,

Many of these wronged views of Poland have also built up some Russian channels of influence, which are, after all, highly developed in the West. And also see also, I am just talking, about how much money Russia has invested in supporting various institutions through the back door, NGOs, media, people.

After all, it starts here in the hotels, right German arrivals and this is a channel that broadcasts and which and which has coverage. It’s only recently that this Russian information influence has really started to take off a bit screw, but after all, they have been

Functioning for years, and it is impossible to unscrew it, what one has listened to for years, in a year and a half, even with awareness, how brutal Russia’s war in Ukraine. So we today should, if Germany, of course, also agrees to this allocate some funds, then first of all we should

Invest in the younger generation. Because the older generation no longer change views, we should also have some sobriety, sober approach to this and be aware that we already certain beliefs we will not change about ourselves bilaterally. On the other hand, as far as the young are concerned, here

I see a very large field for them to come into contact like this Poland is a very good country to meet with different cultures. He gave us here come students from all parts of the world. At Erasmus we have and Kazakhstan, and Japan and so on. So cool to have them all here.

Like having to listen to this exchange of views and also present to them how we here in this part of the world think. Because it turns out that they are adjacent to each other, but we just have completely different visions, even though we are so close, right?

Because they get something out of school and so do we. And now it’s cool, it’s cool to confront it. I would invest in the young, I would also invest, and here I say, I’ll finish this thought about arms cooperation, which is difficult, and I said

About why, but I would invest in some financing for joint startups. We have on our side very capable young people who build various programs, applications. These ideas are multiplying on our side. Germany is a high-tech powerhouse, right? So here I am, in this field and construction

Such a platform I would also see some joint investment. Well, because in my opinion, you have to start precisely from the bottom. It sounds a little messy, well, but I wouldn’t have expected that either politicians will bring us some huge breakthroughs here. Even if this government

Will be perhaps less rhetorically attacking Germany and Germans also already after the outbreak of war in Ukraine. So rhetorically they will not attack us. I’m the one who has little faith, to be honest the fact that politicians will make some serious mental and life changes. The change in mentality ov must take place.

There is simply no other way than to build close relationships over many years. And we had these close relations in the 1990s, I will remind you – Viadrina, I will remind the cooperation of many foundations, where I, as a young person, went to the

Germany, yes, they were coming to us and we really had a lot of opportunities, many opportunities to discuss and build relationships with our German partners. So today I would just go back to it. That’s it. So learn each other, visit, how to invest in each other. Exchanges. Mutuals. Because despite the fact that

In the 1990s we experienced a boom, yes, such a boom in Polish-German relations, then we neglected it perhaps in the perspective of regular work. Mr. Paweł Behrendt raised his hand earlier and I would like to give you the floor. First, however, you also mentioned a very important thing about this

Cross-border cooperation between Poland and Germany on just such a smaller scale, between Polish municipalities, counties and, for example german states. Given what you said, Ms. Winter-Górka, I suspect you want to address that. Is this really the key, in your opinion to change this mutual perception of each other? So this.

I would say one of the keys, certainly very important. On the other hand, I would like to raise another issue, a little back to what we have already discussed, namely, in our discussion, in fact, in all discussions that we have been rolling so far, one topic has always escaped us.

We forget that in mid-June Germany published a its first-ever National Security Strategy. And of course, to make things even more interesting, this is a strategy prepared by the the German Foreign Ministry, headed for some by Annalena Baerbock. But what is significant about the strategy, Germany is beginning to say

Language that is more understandable, more acceptable in Poland. The fact that to put it very colloquially in this strategy is not crazy. But on several points. Mr. Paweł, then. What such will we find in Germany’s security strategy? Above all, it is very clearly stated that Russia has become a threat.

Not so much a challenge as a threat. And this is a threat to the entire current security architecture in Europe. That is, we have the first common point. The second common point, which is very important. For this will be the last one I mention,

Is to say that Europe’s security at the moment has no other option must rely on NATO and the United States. That is, Germany is reaching the same point again view as Poland, much to France’s displeasure. Aha, okay. Well, but then we already have some two points in common.

Dr. Zalewski raised his hand. What is it, are we beginning to understand each other finally with the Germans? That’s right. So I think we have to, too. I agree with Dr. Winter and with Mr. Robert that understanding is the key.

And this paradoxically seems to us, unless we have so many points of divergence. We agree that there are discrepancies. But it seems to me that, however, with Germany, if we compare, for example, in the European Union on many issues, we have quite similar opinions.

If we focus on security, which is the topic of our. One of the topics of our conversation today, after all, we know all of them American strengthening of Polish defense capabilities must go through Germany and through German ports at least. It’s kind of hard to imagine the flourishing of Polish-American cooperation without Germany.

This is what we should always think about in such a triangle. Of course, we can, of course, talk to the Americans and to the Germans and try to, for example. certain things in Berlin to change, and this is very useful. In contrast, this basic community and understanding of security interests,

As presented by Mr. Paweł, however, is very crucial. That is, in Germany, the German elite continues to be Atlanticist. And if we talk to the Spanish or the French, a lot of our interlocutors can often have a very different, different perception on this. Some of them could take part

As young people in demonstrations against NATO. At the moment there is no such demonstration in Poland and there is no such demonstration in Germany either. And that pretty much says how deeply these two countries are entrenched in the alliance. I think it is. On the other hand, it is indeed necessary to build

At various levels a platform for understanding and agreement. And when it comes to student exchanges and youth exchanges, I am all for it. I was a member of the council for many years The Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation, which just by exchange of the Polish-German Youth Cooperation, where the so-called Jugendwerk.

And there indeed a lot of young people are leaving, and that’s a very good thing. The trouble is that we need to figure out how to make it work for the Poles, for young Poles and Polish women, going to Germany was attractive such exchanges. And vice versa. This is a big, big challenge,

Such things happen, and it is. Not too insignificant, but still much less than in the 1990s. And the second thing that concerns the youth we must pay attention to, and here we resist on research by the German Youth Institute. In 2018, there were a third of young Germans, 34% had a migrant background.

Parts from our region, in part from Poland, but nevertheless often from very different parts of the world. As a result, Germany has globalized. This society has become much more perennial. But also these young people often have Aas if brought from home beliefs about threats and about politics.

And it seems to me that this is also a challenge, Because the next generation of young German male and female leaders will be a little different from what we are used to. In this regard, it seems to me that we need to set themselves up for this challenge,

Because it won’t just be a matter of them being had a different skin color, or they will have a different skin color, or followed a different religion, but they will also think differently about the world. That is, we must, in short, focus on this generation that enters the Bundestag in sneakers

Currently, as used to be said in journalism German, for example, about the young leaders of the German political scene. Yes, but of course it will be a phenomenon growing, and I think that in some sense the polarization of the German political scene around the AFD on the one hand,

Which will remain a party, let’s say traditionally German largely and mainly leftist or green parties, which will increasingly more German, but at the same time multicultural. These oppositions will get stronger and stronger in Germany, it seems to me. Therefore, we as Poles are experiencing and Polish society is probably experiencing a similar process.

But Germany, on the other hand, is much further along here, with all its positive and negative consequences. Therefore, it seems to me that we need to learn a different German society and other German elites than the kind we have had so far. This is the first thing. After which both Ms. Winter

Mentioned students from Germany, young journalists, this is very important. In contrast, our trouble has always been to reach the business elite. I.e. on the one hand, it may seem paradoxical, because we have a great economic job. Twenty-something percent of our foreign trade goes to Germany. Germany is our first trading partner.

For Germany, too, we are increasingly important, because we We are Germany’s fourth or fifth trading partner, historically the highest. But on the other hand, we have this trade and investment of ours is so functional. On the other hand, I have the impression that German business elites are not very familiar with Poland.

And I, at least, do not know of any organized way in the Polish economic and political elites to this group. There is something to build on, there is someone to refer to and something to relate to. But I interrupted probably still very please.

No, because it was such a group before the Russian invasion on Russian to Ukraine, and it was probably called the Eastern Committee of the German Economy A very influential group that talked all the time about how Russia is a great country and what great prospects German companies have there. And

There such a dialogue on various economic forums between the absolute top German business and Russian business was continuous. And it seems to me that we as Poles we should and Poland, as a Polish society, should consider how to the way our business, our political elites should talk to the German

Business elites, who are highly oriented to the world and often this immediate environment they do not see as we would like. Dear All, I think this was the perfect punchline to our discussion today. We leave this question open, not only to you as a

Viewers, but also hopefully people will ask themselves similar questions determining, among other things, the shape of Polish-German relations. I for one thank you very much today. This was another discussion organized by the New Confederation and the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation. I, for one, had the pleasure of speaking

Today with Dr. Beata Górka-Winter, Mr. Dr. Krzysztof Zalewski and Mr. Pawłem Behrend. My name is Gabriela Masztafiak and I invite you to join me you are cordially invited to follow all the debates in the current series, as the all of them are published or will still be on our YouTube channel.

I also encourage you to make our channel subscribe, post comments on these comments very warmly. We thank you very much for them and respond to them. See you there! Thank you for today and welcome to further discussions.